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‘Law Reporting’ in Europe in the Early-Modern
Period: Two Experiences in Comparison
DOLORES FREDA
This article challenges the cliche´ handed down to us by the European legal
tradition of a marked contrast between ‘common law’, assumed as case-law/
anti-doctrinal law, always opposed to ‘civil law’, seen as doctrinal/non
case-law. Focusing on English and Italian legal historiography on the
great tribunals and the collections of their decisions on both sides of the
channel, the article attempts to show that the traditional paradigm cannot
be applied tout court to the medieval and early-modern period. In particular,
the article highlights that the European continental great tribunals’ deci-
siones, credited with binding force by such powerful and authoritative
courts, can be considered – in a broad sense – nothing else than ‘case-law’.
I. ‘COMMON LAW’ AND ‘CIVIL LAW’: TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES
The European legal tradition has handed down to us the notion (or, better, cliche´) of
a marked contrast between common law, assumed to be an oral and exclusively
jurisprudential law,1 and civil law, seen as a written and doctrinal law rationalized
and formalized through codification. Codification itself – with its legalistic, positiv-
istic and anti-jurisprudential ideologies – and, above all, the consequent elaboration
of the concepts of ‘system’ and ‘law as science’ by the German ‘Pandektistik’ have
contributed to the making and the reinforcement of such a contrast, creating a
substantial opposition between the legal traditions under examination.2
Dr Dolores Freda, Universita Degli Studi Di Napoli ‘Federico II’, Naples, Italy. Email: dolores.freda@unina.it.
1The words ‘jurisprudence/jurisprudential’ and ‘doctrine/doctrinal’ are used in this article in a continental-
European sense, i.e. as synonymous respectively with ‘case-law’ and ‘academic law’.
2For the traditional division of the so-called ‘civil world’ into big legal ‘areas’, families or traditions see, in
particular, the fundamental works by Rene´e David, Les Grandes Syste`mes de Droit Contemporains, Paris,
1964; John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: an introduction to the legal systems of western
Europe and Latin America, Stanford, 1969; and, more recently, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ko¨tz, An Intro-
duction to Comparative Law, vol.1, The Framework, trans. Tony Weir, Amsterdam, 1977 (2nd ed., Oxford,
1987). The distinctive features of common law and civil law have been explored by Raoul C. Van Caene-
gem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: chapters in European legal history, Cambridge, 1987, 1–65, who
has synthesized/simplified the distinction between the two legal systems in ten main differences, explained
by the different institutional structures and stages of political development of the countries belonging to the
two legal traditions. Van Caenegem – notwithstanding the reduction of the main divergences from ten to
six – has confirmed the distance between the systems under consideration in European Law in the Past and
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One of the drawbacks of the dichotomy between the two ‘systems’ of common
law and civil law, destined to take deep root in the European legal consciousness,3
has been the rise – until recent years and with some well known exceptions4 – of
a sort of mutual ‘distrust’ and, at the same time, of a lack of interest on behalf of
the continental European legal historians in English law and on the part of their
English colleagues in continental European law. The English have praised the
beneficial ‘resistance’ of the common law to the penetration and reception of Roman
law in England and, consequently, the ability of local law to remain immune from
the foreign ‘contamination’.5 On the other hand, their continental European colleagues
have emphasized the ‘insularity’ and, therefore, the atypical and eccentric character
of English law in respect to the European common legal tradition.6
Nevertheless, in recent years Italian legal historians have begun to ‘open’ to the
study of the history of European legal culture from a different and wider perspective
that also includes the history of English law and, consequently, appears far from the
traditional ‘italocentric’ attitude (or, at least, continental-European attitude) typical of
most of the Italian textbooks and studies dating back to the twentieth century.7 In fact,
it has been recently recognized by Italian legal historians that legal history and legal
comparison are strictly tied to each other,8 and that an international and European
the Future: unity and diversity over two millennia, Cambridge, 2002, describing them as ‘neighbours yet
strangers’ (p.38). See also on the subject, Peter Stein, ‘Roman Law, Common Law and Civil Law’, 66
Tulane Law Review (1992), 1591–1603.
3Van Caenegem himself (Judges, Legislators and Professors), never brings into question the existence of a
deep and irreducible distance between the two legal traditions – ‘no half measures prevailed: the differ-
ences are fundamental’, p.2; ‘their very substance was different’, p.113; ‘common law was so different’,
p.119; and, lastly, ‘these legal systems . . . always remained alien to each other’ (An Historical Introduction
to Private Law, trans. D.E.L. Johnston, Cambridge, 1992, vii) – taking it for granted and assuming it as an
undoubted given datum within which to reconstruct and tell the history of European law.
4I refer, in particular, to the work of Frederic William Maitland and Paul Vinogradoff.
5This point of view, destined to be dogmatically accepted by historiography, had already been affirmed, at
the beginning of the twentieth century, in a famous essay by Frederic William Maitland, English Law and
the Renaissance, Cambridge, 1901, repr. in Helen M. Cam, ed., Selected Historical Essays of F.W. Mait-
land, Cambridge, 1957, 135ff.
6Luigi Moccia, ‘English Law Attitudes to the “Civil Law”’, 2 Journal of Legal History (1981), 157–168.
See also, for a criticism of the ‘insularity’ of common law, Richard H. Helmholz, ‘Continental Law and
Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?’, 6 Duke Law Journal (1990), 1207–28.
7If already in the 1970s Adriano Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa: le fonti e il pensiero giur-
idico, vol.1, Milan, 1979, and Carlo Augusto Cannata, Lineamenti di storia della giurisprudenza europea,
Turin, 1971, had dedicated a section of their volumes to the history of English law, the recent works by
Mario Ascheri, Introduzione storica al diritto moderno e contemporaneo: lezioni e documenti, Turin,
2003; Mario Caravale, Ordinamenti giuridici dell’Europa medievale, Bologna, 1994; Paolo Grossi,
L’Europa del diritto, Rome-Bari, 2007; Antonio Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa, vol.1,
Il medioevo, Padua, 1995; Antonio Padoa Schioppa, Italia ed Europa nella storia del diritto, Bologna,
2003; Antonia Padoa Schioppa, Storia del diritto in Europa: dal medioevo all’eta` contemporanea,
Bologna, 2007, share the same view. Also the works by Italo Birocchi, Alla ricerca dell’ordine: fonti e
cultura giuridica nell’eta` moderna, Turin, 2002; Ennio Cortese, Il diritto nella storia medievale, Rome,
1995; Ugo Petronio, La lotta per la codificazione, Turin, 2002; Giovanni Tarello, Storia della cultura giur-
idica moderna: assolutismo e codificazione del diritto, Bologna, 1976, notwithstanding the different topics
and periods covered, have in common the choice of a European perspective.
8F.W. Maitland, ‘Why the History of English Law is not Written’, in H.A.L. Fisher, ed., The Collected
Papers of Frederic William Maitland, 3 vols., Cambridge, 1911, vol.1, 488, had said, many years
before, that ‘History involves comparison and the English lawyer who knew nothing and cared nothing
for any system but his own hardly came in sight of the idea of legal history.’
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historical approach is nowadays indispensable not only to understand what the various
European legal traditions have in common, but also to be able to catch the distinctive
features of the law of the individual areas and, at the same time, the typical features of
the European legal-historical tradition as a whole.9
Such a recent ‘opening’ is connected to a wider process which follows the most
recent historical, political and cultural international developments – for instance,
the breakdown of the socialist regime in the former Soviet Union and the consequent
change of the balance of power in the world, the building and enlargement of the
European Union, the modernization and democratization of the post-colonial
countries, the information technology and commerce revolution and the consequent
phenomenon of the so-called ‘globalization’ and, besides, the global rise of the
common law of contracts imposed by the market economy – which have induced
comparatists themselves to revise and reconsider the relationship between the two
systems of civil law and Anglo-American law and, at the same time, to recognize a
sort of ‘closeness’ between them.10 Thanks to the sociological and anthropological
approaches developed during the last decades of the twentieth century,11 nowadays
comparatists commonly talk of a single great ‘Western legal tradition’ or ‘Western
legal culture’12 – including the European, north American and Australian/New
Zealander cultures and opposed to the African, Asian and Islamic ones – where
9See, on this theme, Antonio Padoa Schioppa, ‘Per una storia comparata del diritto europeo’, in Onofrio
Troiano, Giunio Rizzelli, and Marco Nicola Miletti, eds., Harmonisation involves History? Il diritto
privato europeo al vaglio della comparazione e della storia, Milan, 2004, 23–36, who affirms that it is
not possible to write the history of any national law unless a European perspective is adopted (p.32).
See also Antonio Padoa Schioppa, ‘Verso una storia del diritto europeo’, in Studi di storia del diritto,
vol.3, Milan, 2001, 1–26.
10A first change of perspective is in the essay by Gino Gorla and Luigi Moccia, ‘A “Revisiting” of the Com-
parison between “Continental Law” and “English Law” (16th–19th Century)’, 2 Journal of Legal History
(1981), 143–156, who highlighted the similarities, rather than the differences between the two systems of
continental European law and English law, both regarded as part of a common and unitary European legal
tradition. See also the essays collected in the volume by Gino Gorla, Diritto comparato e diritto comune
europeo, Milan, 1981. The limits of the traditional view have been pointed out by Guido Alpa, Il diritto
privato nel prisma della comparazione, Turin, 2004; Alessandro Pizzorusso, Sistemi giuridici comparati,
Milan, 1998; Antonio Gambaro and Rodolfo Sacco, Sistemi giuridici comparati, Turin, 1996, 41–59;
James Gordley, ‘Common Law v Civil Law: una distinzione che sta scomparendo’, in Paolo Cendon,
ed., Scritti in onore di Rodolfo Sacco: la comparazione giuridica alle soglie del terzo millennio, vol.1,
Milan, 1994; Mark Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine:
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’, 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1998),
501–502, who remarked that common law and civil law ‘are very close to a point where there will no
longer be paradigmatical differences. What will be left is some difference of degree, not of a fundamental
nature’, and that ‘the whole “legal families” division is now collapsing’.
11See especially the fundamental work on the interpretation of cultures by the anthropologist Clifford
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays, New York, 1973, and the studies by the sociologist
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: a Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’, 14
Journal of Law and Society (1987), 279–302.
12The notion of a common ‘Western legal tradition’, including English and American legal history, has been
elaborated in a famous work by Harold Joseph Berman, Law and Revolution: the formation of the western
legal tradition, Cambridge, MA, 1983. Berman, investigating the crisis of the so-called ‘Western civiliza-
tion’, highlighted the main features and the common historical roots of its legal tradition (law autonomous
from religion, politics, morals and custom; legal institutions run by professional lawyers educated in their
own law schools; law strictly tied to legal science; law as an organic ‘body’ able to evolve historically and
according to its own internal logic; pluralism of jurisdictions and legal systems; rule of law; evolution of
law as a consequence of the radical and dramatic changes brought by revolutions).
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the traditional opposition between common law and civil law appears to be totally
meaningless.13
The present debate on the ‘building’ of a European common private law itself and
the consequent invigorated interest in European legal history has not only involved
both comparatists and legal historians,14 but has also contributed to the current under-
standing of the relationship between common law and civil law. Some comparatists
and comparative-romanists have recently ambitiously and often questionably
attempted to recover a European legal tradition – Roman law, ius commune – in
order to legitimize historically the harmonization of the European Union states’
various national legal systems through the theorizing of a modern ius commune euro-
paeum (or, as it has been put, of a ‘re-Europeanization of legal science’ apt to over-
come the present ‘legal nationalism’15). On the other hand, these attempts, starting
since the 1990s, have posed new questions and raised new issues: in fact, they
have inevitably drawn lawyers’ attention to the debate on the distance between the
two legal systems of continental European law and English law, in some cases –
more often – directing it towards the hypothesis of their ‘convergence’ and the exces-
sive emphasizing of their similarities,16 while in others, directing it towards a no less
13Ugo Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’, 45 American
Journal of Comparative Law (1997), 5–44, underlined the need to re-map the world’s contemporary legal
systems and their fundamental features. The new postmodern perspectives and their influence on compara-
tive law have been stressed by Kiel A˚. Mode´er, ‘La comparazione come critica della cultura giuridica: un
discorso tra globalizzazione e regionalizzazione’, 2 Le Carte e la Storia (2002), 7–16.
14An example is the interdisciplinary conference, held in Foggia in 2003, on the relationship between Euro-
pean private law, legal comparison and legal history, whose papers are collected in Onofrio Troiano, Giunio
Rizzelli, and Marco Nicola Miletti, eds., Harmonisation involves History? Il diritto privato europeo al
vaglio della comparazione e della storia, Milan, 2004.
15Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Civil Code and Civil law: The “Europeanization” of Private Law within the
European Community and the Re-Emergence of a European Legal Science’, 1 Columbia Journal of Euro-
pean Law (1994–95), 63–105. See also Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and European Legal Unity’,
in Arthur S. Hartkamp and Gerrit Betlem, eds., Towards a European Civil Code, Dordrecht, 1994, 65–81;
Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Diritto romano, diritto contemporaneo, diritto europeo: la tradizione civilistica
oggi. (Il diritto privato europeo e le sue basi storiche)’, 47,6 Rivista di diritto civile (2001), 703–712.
See further, on this theme, Klaus Luig, ‘The History of Roman Private Law and the Unification of European
Law’, 5 Zeitschrift fu¨r Europa¨isches Privatrecht (1997), 405–427.
16Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Der europa¨ische Charakter des englischen Rechts. Historische Verbindungen
zwischen civil law und common law’, 1 Zeitschrift fu¨r Europa¨isches Privatrecht (1993), 4–51, high-
lighted the presence of a legal tradition common to the two systems of common law and civil law.
See also, just to mention some of his main contributions to the subject, Reinhard Zimmermann, The
Law of Obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition, Cape Town, 1990, chs.7–16; Reinhard
Zimmermann, ‘Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European
Legal Science’, 112 Law Quarterly Review (1996), 576–605. This view has been adopted by H. Patrick
Glenn, ‘La civilisation de la common law’, 3 Revue International de Droit Compare´ (1993), 559ff.; B.S.
Markesinis, ed., The Gradual Convergence: foreign ideas, foreign influences and English law on the eve
of the twenty-first century, Oxford, 1994; B.S. Markesinis, ed., The Coming Together of the Common Law
and the Civil Law, Oxford, 2000; Maurizio Lupoi, Alle radici del mondo giuridico europeo: saggio
storico-comparativo, Rome, 1994. See, for a strong polemic against this perspective, Pier Giuseppe Mon-
ateri, Tomasz Giaro, and Alessandro Somma, eds., Le radici comuni del diritto europeo: un cambiamento
di prospettiva, Rome, 2005 (see, in particular, the essay by Giaro, ‘Diritto romano attuale. Mappe mentali
e strumenti concettuali’, at 77–168). Lastly, Douglas Osler, ‘The Fantasy Men’, 10 Rechtsgeschichte
(2007), 169–193, harshly criticizing Zimmermann’s view, has caustically defined the theorizing of a
modern ius commune europaeum, grounded on a European legal unity (and, at the same time, on a
uniform continental and English legal culture), and embodied by the ius commune until the
266 LEGAL HISTORY
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radical re-emphasis and drastic highlighting of the differences between the legal tra-
ditions under consideration.17
The present initial change of perspective involving both comparatists and legal
historians has led, for different reasons and along different paths, to a slow
‘opening’ and to a progressive ‘closeness’ or ‘dialogue’ (to use an effective and
well known expression to which I will return18) between English and continental
European legal systems, showing that the difference between them was less great
than had been supposed. Nevertheless, such a new attitude has not been able – at
least, not yet – to challenge some of the assumptions arising from the traditional
view of the marked contrast between the two legal traditions.
In particular, understanding of the difference between common law and civil
law, identified tout court with the difference between case-law and codified law,
appears to have been focused on the topic of the different attitudes, within the two
jurisdictions, towards ‘precedent’. At the same time, it seems to have focused on
the different weight to be given, within the two systems, to previous decisions (i.e.
resort – or not – to the doctrine of stare decisis), with the consequence of putting
in the shade the two legal traditions’ other features. Besides, with time this difference
has so deeply taken root in the European legal consciousness as to be projected
backward. This has given rise to a misleading over-simplification which has
generated an idea of common law always assumed as case-law or ‘jurisprudential/
anti-doctrinal law’, always opposed to continental European law seen as ‘doctrinal/
non case-law’.
In summary, the ‘obsession’ with the presence (or not) of the observance of
the authority of precedents within the legal traditions under consideration, and the
consequent prevailing focus of attention on that aspect by both lawyers and legal
historians, has not allowed them to fairly evaluate and entirely understand the two
legal systems’ peculiar features. Consequently, the (undeniable) differences have
been very often overemphasized, while the (real) similarities have been very fre-
quently overlooked. On the contrary, the more we look backward, moving away
from the present time, the more the differences appear to fade away while the
similarities strengthen.
nineteenth-century national codifications, as a ‘historia fanta´stica’, a ‘chimaera’ (23–24) which does not
take into account the historical reality of the religious, political and juridical conflicts of the modern period.
17See Oliver Remien, ‘Illusion und Realita¨t eines europa¨ischen Privatrechts’, 47 Juristenzeitung (1992),
277–284; Eugen Bucher, ‘Recht, Geschichtlichkeit, Europa’, in Bruno Schmidlin, ed., Vers un droit
prive´ europe´en commun?: skizzen zum gemeineuropa¨ischen privatrecht, Basel, 1994, 7–31, and, above
all, Pierre Legrand, ‘Legal Traditions in Western Europe: The Limits of Commonality’, in
R. Jagtenberg, E. O¨ru¨cu and A.J. De Roo, eds., Transfrontier Mobility of Law, The Hague, 1995, 63ff.;
Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’, 45 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly (1996), 52–81, who has even assumed the existence of an irreducible epistemological gulf
between the two legal systems of common law and civil law – seen as the expression of opposite legal ‘cul-
tures’, ‘mentalities’ and ‘representations’ – which would prevent their reciprocal knowledge and real
understanding by lawyers educated within the two different traditions.
18See text at n.40, below.
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II. ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE LAW REPORTS: A FIRST
ATTEMPT TO COMPARE
We cannot deny that codification and the consequent creation of the concept of
‘system’ have put some distance between the legal traditions under examination.
Nevertheless, the traditional paradigm of a marked contrast between the two
systems of ius commune and common law cannot be applied tout court to the medie-
val and early-modern periods. In fact, notwithstanding the undoubted prevailing doc-
trinal character of the ius commune and the prevailing jurisprudential character of
English law,19 the study of the European great tribunals and the collections of their
decisions has made the apparent difference grow weak.
The wider international historiographical renewal which started in the 1980s was
marked not only by a growing and widespread interest in the early-modern period, but
also by putting the supreme royal courts’ jurisprudence in a European frame. An
important result of such a new perspective was the fundamental work on the
history of European private law by Professor Helmut Coing20 – a great part of
which was dedicated to the European great tribunals and legal literature – and, at
the same time, the creation of the international comparative-historical collection of
the Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History.21 Its
intent, clearly stated by Coing himself in the first volume, was – and still is – to
encourage researchers coming from the continental European and Anglo-American
legal traditions (different but, nevertheless, sharing some common features) to
exchange their views and to cooperate.22
It should be noted that English legal historians who have devoted their studies to
the royal courts at Westminster and, above all, to law reporting during the medieval
and early-modern periods have over time increasingly taken part in the Comparative
Studies collection. In the 1980s, in fact, Anglo-American legal historians – originally
19J.H. Baker, ‘English Law and the Renaissance’, 44 Cambridge Law Journal (1985), 46, repr. in J.H.
Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law: historical essays, London, 1986, 461, has argued
for a doctrinal approach in English law in the Middle Ages, and a shift from it to a jurisprudential approach
during the sixteenth century.
20Helmut Coing, ed., Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europa¨ischen Privatrechts-
geschichte, Munich, 1973.
21The first volume of the collection, Helmut Coing and Knut Wolfgang No¨rr, eds., Englische und Kontinen-
tale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsproject (Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American
Legal History (CSCALH) 1), Berlin, 1985, has been followed by another twenty-five, the most recent pub-
lished in 2008. The great tribunals, the law collections and procedural law are the subject of Vito Piergio-
vanni, ed., The Courts and the Development of Commercial Law (CSCALH 2), Berlin, 1987; Antonio Padoa
Schioppa, ed., The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700–1900 (CSCALH 4), Berlin, 1987; J.H.
Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports and the Growth of Case Law (CSCALH 5), Berlin, 1989; Alain
Wijffels, ed., Case Law in the Making: the techniques and methods of judicial records and law reports
(CSCALH 17,1), Berlin, 1997; and W. Hamilton Bryson and Serge Dauchy, eds., Ratio Decidendi,
vol.1, Case Law (CSCALH 25,1), Berlin, 2006.
22Helmut Coing, ‘Common Law and Civil Law in the Development of European Civilization – Possibilities
of Comparisons’, in Coing and No¨rr, eds., Englische und Kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte, 31ff. See also
Helmut Coing, ‘The Roman Law as Ius Commune on the Continent’, 89 Law Quarterly Review (1973),
505–517; Helmut Coing, ‘European Common Law: Historical Foundations’, in Mauro Cappelletti, ed.,
New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Stuttgart, 1978, 31–44, where he talks about ‘a
common European heritage in law’ (32).
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not much interested in continental law collections23 – began to confer and to
cooperate with the European legal historians who had focused their attention on the
continental European collections of decisiones. Within a wider interest in the com-
parison between common law and civil law and, in particular, in the historical com-
parison between the two legal systems,24 legal historians who have devoted their
research to law reporting began to wonder whether the traditional opposition
between continental European law and Anglo-American law was not a misleading
over-simplification and whether there were not more analogies between the two
legal systems than had generally been believed in the past.25
In fact, English legal historians have highlighted that law reporting – subject to
local variation – concerned all Europe, and have even discerned four separate Euro-
pean ‘traditions’ in its history during the medieval and early-modern periods: the
English reports (year books and nominate reports); the collections of the arreˆts of
the Paris parlement; the decisiones of the rota of Avignon; and, finally, the decisiones
of supreme royal courts.26 Such different ‘traditions’, whose peculiar features have
been pointed out too (especially in respect of the function, form and contents of the
reports,27 features strictly connected also to local procedure and to the role of the judi-
ciary in the different jurisdictions) have been considered in a wider European
perspective.
English legal historians have started not only to pose new comparative questions
– many of which will find a final answer only following further comparative-histori-
cal research on both sides of the English channel – but also to formulate some initial,
although superficial, hypotheses. In particular, it has been pointed out that the conti-
nental European collections of decisiones, consilia and arreˆts, widely circulating and
quoted within the great tribunals all over Europe, can be considered – in a broad
23Before then, apart from a very short reference to continental European law collections in the introduction
to F.W. Maitland, ed., Year Books of Edward II, 1 & 2 Edward II, A.D. 1307–9 (Selden Society 17),
London, 1903, xix, and in T.F.T. Plucknett, Early English Legal Literature, Cambridge, 1958, 102,
English legal historians who devoted their studies to law reporting appeared not to be much interested in
the civil law counterpart. Only H.D. Hazeltine, in the introduction to William Craddock Bolland, A
Manual of Year Book Studies, Cambridge, 1925, xiv, had hoped for a comparison between English
reports and continental European collections of decisiones which would be useful, in his opinion, also in
reconstructing the history of the legal profession either in England or on the continent.
24See, on the subject, the pioneering comparative-historical studies by John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the
Law, Ann Arbor, 1968, who compared the history of the development of Roman, English, French and
German law up to the twentieth century; and, from the same perspective, Peter Stein, I fondamenti del
diritto europeo: profili sostanziali e processuali dell’evoluzione dei sistemi giuridici, Milan, 1987, and
Olivia F. Robinson, T. David Fergus and William Morrison Gordon, European Legal History: sources
and institutions, London, 1994.
25J.H. Baker, ‘Case-Law: Reports and Records’, in Coing and No¨rr, eds., Englische und Kontinentale
Rechtsgeschichte, 49ff.; Baker, The Legal Profession, 468–476; J.H. Baker, ‘Records, Reports and the
Origins of Case Law in England’, in Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, 5, described the marked
opposition between the two legal systems as a ‘misleading over-simplification’. This view has been
adopted by David Ibbetson and Alain Wijffels, ‘Case Law in the Making: the Techniques and Methods
of Judicial Records and Law Reports’, in Wijffels, ed., Case Law in the Making, 13ff.; David Ibbetson,
Common Law and Ius Commune (Selden Society lecture 2000), London, 2001.
26See Baker, ‘Case-Law’, 51–53.
27Here the word ‘reports’ is not used in its technical meaning, i.e. it refers not only to common law reports
but, more widely, also to continental European collections of decisiones.
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sense – nothing other than case-law. And also that such collections – characterized
by an analogous great variety of style and content with English reports – had no offi-
cial status as they were normally made by interested judges and advocates privately
and for their own use. Furthermore, it has been stressed that during the early-modern
period law students and legal practitioners had to become acquainted with the
superior courts’ jurisprudence on the continent as well as in England. In summary,
it has been acknowledged once and for all that ‘by the sixteenth century there was
more law reporting on the continent than in the home of the common law’.28
At the same time, some of the main differences between English reports and con-
tinental European collections of decisiones during the early-modern period have been
noted. First of all, the focus on the arguments of advocates and judges – together with
the frequent omission of the final outcome of the dispute – in the reports and, in con-
trast, the presence of the decisio (nevertheless, usually reported without its ratio deci-
dendi) in the ius commune collections. Then, the different space given to facts,
undoubtedly smaller within the English reports and larger within the continental
European ones, perhaps also in connection with local divergences in procedure: in
the common law jurisdiction, in fact, fact-finding was the task of the jury, while in
the ius commune system of adjudication it was the task of the legally-trained judge.
Lastly, the different concept of authority, anchored in the observance of reason and
custom in England and in contrast connected to the ‘name’ and authority of the
doctor, interpreter of the monarch’s will, on the continent.29
Such initial attempts to compare the English and continental European legal tra-
ditions, and the consequent first (general) remarks and interpretations – either those
which highlighted the similarities between the two systems, or those which, on the
contrary, emphasized the distance between them – have not been followed so far
by any real attempt to compare the law collections circulating in England and on
the continent during the period under examination.30 The undeniable difficulties
arising from the existence in every jurisdiction of a different local procedure –
with the different roles of the judiciary in finding and weighing facts, obviously
inseparably connected to the different ‘shape’ of law reports themselves – make
the interesting topic of the comparison between English reports and continental
European collections of decisiones a field of research still widely unexplored.
The initial hypotheses formulated by the latest English historiography require
further investigation in order to be developed and confirmed. To that purpose it
would be extremely useful – following the Anglo-American example31 – to start
searching the mare magnum of the great tribunals’ archives in order to edit (at
least some of) the courts’ official records of continental decisiones and to compare
28Baker, ‘Records, Reports’, 6.
29Ibid., 9–10. For a concise, but accurate survey of the continental-European and Anglo-American tra-
ditions of ‘law-reporting’, see also Ibbetson and Wijffels, ‘Case Law in the Making’, 16ff.
30The continental-European law collections (with particular reference to the decisions of the Roman rota
and the Sacro Regio Consiglio of Naples) were first mentioned by Baker, The Legal Profession, 468–
471. See also the comparative-historical essay by Ibbetson and Wijffels, ‘Case Law in the Making’, 13–35.
31I refer, in particular, to the work carried on by the Selden Society, which has published more than 120
volumes on the common law sources so far.
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them to the existing private and unofficial law collections:32 this would allow legal
historians to investigate the judges’ legal reasoning process and the chronology and
modes of the emergence of ‘case-law’ on the continent too. At the same time,
further research on the relationship between the advent and diffusion of print on
both sides of the channel and the reporting of legal cases33 – mostly in print on the
continent, in manuscript in England34 – would help a better understanding of the
needs of the legal profession both in everyday legal practice and in legal education
during the early-modern period.
It is clear that comparative-historical research on law reporting – considered as a
European phenomenon – is still at an initial stage and, before we can venture any
confident assessment, the first important and interesting assumptions35 need to be ver-
ified and deepened, taking into account the results of the research carried out so far by
legal historians all over Europe. Nevertheless, credit must certainly be given to the
English legal historians for having broadened the horizons of legal history, casting,
for the first time in the history of law reporting, a curious glance beyond the channel.
III. ITALIAN LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE COLLECTIONS OF
DECISIONES: A CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN CASE-LAW?
Extensive research on the European great tribunals and the collections of their deci-
siones has been carried out by Italian legal historians: starting from the 1970s, leading
to a wider and growing interest in the early-modern period – until then overlooked
and held to be subordinate to the Middle Ages36 – Italian legal historians began to
investigate the role and the function of the supreme royal courts and their jurispru-
dence. The topic had already found a little space in a few monographs;37 but it was
Professor Gino Gorla, a comparatist endowed with a special sensitivity to history,
who – turning Maitland’s famous assertion ‘history involves comparison’ to ‘com-
parison involves history’38 – through much research on the Italian great tribunals
and their jurisprudence, has been a real pioneer in the field, raising new questions
32Marguerite Boulet, Quaestiones Johannis Galli, Paris, 1944, edited the decisiones of the Paris Parlement
reported by Jean Le Coq (fourteenth-century) and compared it to the court’s official records; as far as I
know, on the continent the example has never been followed.
33The demand for legal texts by common lawyers has been investigated by J.H. Baker, ‘The Books of the
Common Law’, in Lotte Hellinga and J.B. Trapp, eds., Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, vol.3,
1400–1557, Cambridge, 1999, 411ff.; Sir John Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol.6,
1483–1558, Oxford, 2003, 491ff.
34While the year books printed in England during the sixteenth century were numerous, only a few collec-
tions of reports were printed before the seventeenth century: Baker, The Legal Profession, 446, affirmed that
‘for every printed volume of cases there are perhaps half a dozen or a dozen unpublished volumes’.
35Cf. text accompanying nn.25–29, above.
36Gino Gorla, ‘Un Centro di studi storico-comparativi sul “Diritto comune europeo”’, 5 Il Foro Italiano
(1978), 313, had described the lack of historical research in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries,
with particular reference to Italian and continental-European jurisprudence, as ‘la grande lacuna’ (‘the
big gap’) in Italian legal history.
37Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno, 155–171, 225–236; Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica
moderna, 55ff, 67ff.; Vincenzo Piano Mortari, Gli inizi del diritto moderno, Naples, 1980, 419–433.
38Gino Gorla, Il contratto: problemi fondamentali trattati con il metodo comparativo e casistico, prefa-
zione, Milan, 1955.
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and setting new research trends.39 Professor Gorla, in particular – breaking with the
Italian traditional ‘italocentric’ view of the law – was the first to envisage the possi-
bility of a historical comparison (or, better, a ‘dialogue’40) between the systems of
common law and civil law. In his opinion, in fact, the study of the European great tri-
bunals and of the collections of their decisions could represent a meeting point of the
two legal traditions on the ground of their common jurisprudential character.41
Gorla’s studies have been followed by Professor Mario Ascheri, whose research
on the Italian great tribunals and their collections of decisiones during the medieval
and early-modern periods not only confirmed the previous results in many respects,
but also added new data on the role of the jurisprudence of the rote and senati in
the early-modern period.42 These first fundamental studies gave birth to quite a sig-
nificant number of works dedicated to the superior courts of the Italian states43
and, at the same time, to the conference on ‘Grandi Tribunali e Rote’ organized by
Professor Mario Sbriccoli in Macerata in 1990,44 where the results of the latest
research were set out. During the same period and the following decade, further
39See, in particular, among his numerous essays, contributions and papers, Gino Gorla, ‘I Tribunali Supremi
degli Stati Italiani, fra i secc. XVI e XIX, quali fattori della unificazione del diritto nello Stato e della sua
uniformazione tra Stati (Disegno storico-comparativo)’, in Bruno Paradisi, ed., La formazione storica del
diritto moderno in Europa. Atti del III Congresso internazionale della Societa` italiana di Storia del
diritto, vol.1, Florence, 1977, 447–532; ‘Unificazione “legislativa” e unificazione “giurisprudenziale”.
L’esperienza del diritto comune’, 4 Il Foro Italiano (1977); Gino Gorla, ‘L’origine e l’autorita` delle rac-
colte di giurisprudenza’, 44 Annuario di Diritto Comparato e di Studi Legislativi (1970), 1–23. The com-
plete bibliography of the comparative-historical works by this eminent scholar has been edited by Professor
Luigi Moccia and appended to the volume by Gorla, Diritto comparato, 909–914.
40Gorla, Diritto comparato, 12.
41See especially Gorla and Moccia, ‘A “Revisiting”’, 147; Gino Gorla, ‘La “communis opinio totius orbis”
et la re´ception jurisprudentielle du droit au cours des XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe sie`cles dans la “Civil Law” et
la “Common Law”’, in Cappelletti, ed., New Perspectives, 54. On the jurisprudential character of the
common law system, see also the work by Luigi Lombardi, Saggio sul diritto giurisprudenziale, Milan,
1967, 79–199.
42Mario Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi e istituzioni dal medioevo all’eta` moderna, Bologna, 1989. The existing
Italian printed law collections are here accurately classified and indexed.
43See, in particular, Ugo Petronio, Il Senato di Milano: istituzioni giuridiche ed esercizio del potere nel
Ducato di Milano da Carlo V a Giuseppe II, Milan, 1972; Gian Paolo Massetto, ‘Aspetti della prassi pena-
listica lombarda nell’eta` delle riforme: il ruolo del Senato milanese’, 47 Studia et documenta historiae et
juris (1981), 93; Cesare Mozzarelli, ‘Il Senato di Mantova: origini e funzioni’, 81 Rivista italiana per le
scienze giuridiche (1974); Pierpaolo Merlin, ‘Giustizia, amministrazione e politica nel Piemonte di Ema-
nuele Filiberto. La riorganizzazione del Senato di Torino’, 1 Bollettino Storico Bibliografico Subalpino
(1982), 35; Enrico Genta, Senato e senatori di Piemonte nel secolo XVIII, Turin, 1983; Rodolfo Savelli,
‘Potere e giustizia. Documenti per la storia della Rota criminale a Genova alla fine del “500”’, 5 Materiali
per una storia della cultura giuridica (1975), 29–172; Giuseppe Pansini, ‘La Ruota fiorentina nelle strut-
ture giudiziarie del Granducato di Toscana sotto i Medici’, in Bruno Paradisi, ed., La formazione storica del
diritto moderno in Europa, vol.2, Florence, 1977, 533–579; Umberto Santarelli, ‘L’archivio della Rota
maceratese’, 32 Annali della Facolta` di Giurisprudenza dell’Universita` di Macerata (1976).
44The conference papers, including the ones by Vito Piergiovanni, ‘Una raccolta di sentenze della Rota
civile di Genova nel XVI secolo’; Rodolfo Savelli, ‘Una “rota di dottori cittadini”. Discussioni e progetti
di meta` Seicento a Genova’; Angela De Benedictis, ‘Ideologia e realta` della Rota bolognese nel Settecento’;
Marcello Verga, ‘La Ruota criminale fiorentina (1680–1699). Amministrazione della giustizia penale e isti-
tuzioni nella Toscana medicea tra Sei e Settecento’; and Giuseppe Pansini, ‘Le cause delegate civili nel
sistema giudiziario del Principato mediceo’, have been collected in Mario Sbriccoli and Antonella
Bettoni, eds., Grandi Tribunali e Rote nell’Italia di Antico Regime, Milan, 1993.
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studies have valuably deepened and clarified some of the aspects of the previous
work.45
Such a new interest in the superior courts’ jurisprudence of the early-modern
period has led legal historians to acknowledge the high authority of the decisions
of the European great tribunals.46 Created or restored – between the end of the fif-
teenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth – by the monarchs of European
states as a part of their absolutist policy of centralization directed to unify law
through the enforcement of jurisdiction,47 they were invested with so-called ‘sover-
eign’ powers. In fact, the decisions of these supreme royal courts, attended by
trained, professional judges appointed by the monarch and invested with the power
45For a valuable study of the Neapolitan jurisprudence, see Marco Nicola Miletti, Tra equita` e dottrina: Il
Sacro Regio Consiglio e le ‘decisiones’ di V. De Franchis, Naples, 1995; Stylus judicandi: le raccolte di
‘decisiones’ del Regno di Napoli in eta` moderna, Naples, 1998; Giancarlo Vallone, Le ‘Decisiones’ di
Matteo d’Afflitto, Lecce, 1988. On the Sicilian courts see the works by Andrea Romano, ‘Tribunali,
Giudici e Sentenze nel “Regnum Siciliae” (1130–1516)’, in Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports,
211–301; Andrea Romano, ‘La Regia Gran Corte del Regno di Sicilia’, in Wijffels, ed., Case Law in
the Making, 111–161. See further Gian Paolo Massetto, ‘Sentenza (diritto intermedio)’, 41 Enciclopedia
del diritto (1989), 1200–45, and the interesting essay by Rodolfo Savelli, ‘Tribunali, “decisiones” e giuristi:
una proposta di ritorno alle fonti’, in Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho and Pierangelo Schiera, eds.,
Origini dello Stato: processi di formazione statale in Italia tra medioevo ed eta` moderna (Annali
dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico 39), Bologna, 1994, 397–421. Cf., more recently, on the Roman
rota and the senato of Milan, Angela Santangelo Cordani, La giurisprudenza della Rota romana nel
secolo XIV, Milan, 2001; Annamaria Monti, I formulari del Senato di Milano: secoli XVI–XVIII, Milan,
2001; Iudicare tamquam Deus: i modi della giustizia senatoria nel Ducato di Milano tra Cinque e Sette-
cento, Milan, 2003.
46The most important were the Roman rota and the other rote of Central and Northern Italy, the Senato of
Milan, the Sacro Regio Consiglio of Naples, the Paris Parlement and the other French provincial courts, the
Reichskammergericht in Germany, the Spanish Audientiae of Castile, Aragon, Navarre and Catalonia, and
the Grand Conseil of Malines in the Low Countries. See, among the most recent works on the French Parle-
ments and their jurisprudence, Jean Hilaire and Claudine Bloch, ‘Conaissance des de´cisions de justice et
origine de la jurisprudence’, in Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, 47–68; Bernadette Auzary-
Schmaltz and Serge Dauchy, ‘Le Parlement de Paris’, Bernadette Auzary-Schmaltz, ‘Les recueils
d’arreˆts prive´s au Moyen Age’, Serge Dauchy, ‘Les recueils prive´s de “jurisprudence” aux Temps Moder-
nes’, and Michel Petitjean, ‘Les recueils d’arreˆts bourguignons’, all in Wijffels, ed., Case Law in the
Making, 199–224, 225–236, 237–248, 267–276; Jacques Poumare`de, ‘Les arreˆtistes toulousains’, in
Les Parlements de province: pouvoirs, justice et socie´te´ du XVIIe au XVIIIe sie`cles, Toulouse, 1996;
Serge Dauchy and Ve´ronique Demars-Sion, eds., Les Recueils d’arreˆts et dictionnaires de jurisprudence
(XVIe–XVIIIe sie`cles), Paris, 2005. Cf., in particular, on the reichskammergerichts, Filippo Ranieri, ‘Die
archivalischen und literarischen Quellen aus der Judikatur des Reichskammergerichts (16.–17. Jahrhun-
dert)’, in Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, 303–318; Filippo Ranieri, ‘Entscheidungsfindung
und Technik der Urteilsredaktion in der Tradition des deutschen Usus modernus: das Beispiel der Akten-
relationen am Reichskammergericht’, in Wijffels, ed., Case Law in the Making, 277–298; Bernhard Dies-
telkamp, ed., Das Reichskammergericht in der deutschen Geschichte: Stand der Forschung und
Forschungsperspektiven, Cologne, 1989. See, on the Grand Conseil of Malines and the collections of its
decisions, Alain Wijffels, ‘Legal Records and Reports in the Great Council of Malines (15th to 18th Cen-
turies)’, in Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, 181–206; Robert van Answaarden and Hugo de
Schepper, ‘Bibliografie van de Grote Raad van Mechelen’, and John Gilissen, ‘De Grote Raad van Meche-
len, Historisch overzicht’, both in Workgroep Grote Raad von Mechelen, Miscellanea Consilii Magni,
vol.1, Essays on the History of Forensic Practice/Etudes d’histoire judiciaire, Amsterdam, 1980.
47Adriano Cavanna, La storia del diritto moderno (secoli XVI–XVIII) nella piu` recente storiografia itali-
ana, Milan, 1983, 76. Piano Mortari, Gli inizi del diritto moderno, 419–433, highlighted the instrumental
role of the great tribunals in the exercise of political power by the absolute monarchs of European states,
describing such superior courts as real governing bodies instrumental in the process of nationalization of
law and, at the same time, authors of a creative interpretation of law able to make up for the inadequacy
of the lawgiver.
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to judge in his name, were normally regarded – notwithstanding the diversity of
powers, competences and procedures peculiar to each tribunal – as final and incon-
trovertible, that is, they could not be challenged through ordinary remedies. Some
of these superior courts were even invested with legislative powers: this was, for
instance, true of the Paris Parlement, which had the power to endorse, review and
register the ordinances issued by the monarch before they could come into force,
and which, at the same time, had the power to issue the so-called arreˆts de re`glement,
decisions binding erga omnes apt to regulate matters not already provided for by
statute law or custom.
Although the decisiones of the great tribunals were not officially regarded as
sources of law, Italian historiography has highlighted the superior courts’ tendency
to consider their own decisions as bearing vis legis in practice and, consequently,
as being binding for the future.48 Besides, their authority was so increased in case
of analogous decisions in similar matters that it has been held that the supreme
courts’ usus fori was directly regarded as legally binding.49 In fact, according to
the common practice of the binae iudicaturae itself, a double analogous decision
by a great tribunal would have led to the creation of a real consuetudo iudicandi.50
Moreover, it has been pointed out that, as some supreme royal courts were extre-
mely powerful and authoritative (e.g. the Roman rota or the Sacro Regio Consiglio at
Naples), such a tendency brought about the consolidation of coherent and constant
jurisprudential trends or stylus curiae within individual states. At the same time the
great tribunals, judging in the name of the monarch, delivered decisions which
were considered binding for the inferior courts too. Furthermore, the transnational
character of the jurisprudence of some of the most important superior courts (e.g.
the Roman Rota again) has been stressed: their decisiones were widely known, reported
and quoted beyond the borders of their home states in the law courts throughout the
continent, leading to the creation of real European jurisprudential trends.51
48In Naples Matthaeus de Afflictis (Decisiones Sacri Regii Consilii Neapolitani, per excellentissimum
virum Matthaeum de Afflictis I.C. praestantissimum, eiusdem Sacri Consilii Regium Consiliarium collectae,
Venice, 1584), had affirmed that ‘sententiae . . . habent vim generalis legis in Regno’ (‘decisions . . . are
binding in the Realm’) (dec.383, para.8), and, besides, that ‘ista est nova decisio Sacri Consilii, quae
habet vim legis, et sic facit jus’ (‘this is a new decision of the Sacro Regio Consiglio, which is binding
and must be regarded as law’) (dec.169, para.9), and that ‘nunc est decisus per sententiam regis cum Con-
silio, quae facit jus universale in Regno’ (‘thus the Sacro Regio Consiglio has decided, and its decision is
universally binding in the Realm’) (dec.190, para.7).
49See, for another example of the discussion on the legal effect of the supreme courts’ previous decisions,
the work by Jorge de Cabedo, who – citing many doctrinal authorities (de Afflictis included) – answered
the question ‘An sententiis senatus standum sit ad similes causas decidendas’ (‘Whether Senato’s deci-
siones are binding in deciding similar cases’) in the affirmative: Jorge de Cabedo, Practicarum Observa-
tionum, sive Decisionum Supremi Senatus Regni Lusitaniae, Frankfurt, 1646, vol.1, dec.212, cit. by
Ibbetson, Common Law and Ius Commune, 8–9.
50Gorla, ‘I Tribunali Supremi’, 503–504. That the courts tended, notwithstanding the reluctance to develop
a doctrine of stare decisis, to confer a more stringent authority upon their precedents has been acknow-
ledged by legal historians all over Europe: see, just to mention some among the most significant works,
Auzary-Schmaltz and Dauchy, ‘Parlement de Paris’; Ranieri, ‘Entscheidungsfindung und Technik’;
Alain Wijffels, ‘References to Judicial Precedents in the Practice of the Great Council of Malines (ca.
1460–1580)’, in A. Wijffels, ed., Miscellanea Consilii Magni, vol.3, Amsterdam, 1988, 165–186.
51The institutional function of the great tribunals to unify the law within the various states and, at the same
time, between the states themselves sub specie interpretationis, has been held by Gorla, ‘Unificazione
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Last but not least, Italian legal historians have emphasized that the collections of
decisiones of the main European supreme courts themselves – at least until the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century privately drafted in very large numbers by judges and
advocates and widely circulating all over Europe52 – had a primary role in the devel-
opment of the transnational character of the great tribunals’ jurisprudence.53 And that,
most of all, these reports – credited, as we have seen, with a great authority both
inside and outside their home states – were not only an indispensable case-book
for judges and advocates in everyday practice and a fundamental means of learning
the jurisprudential trends of the various superior courts, but also – given the crisis
of the ius commune caused by the overgrowth of commenta, consilia, tractatus and
communes opiniones which determined great confusion and uncertainty in matters
of law – a valuable source of legal certainty.54
Therefore, according to this interpretation, the decisions of the great tribunals
played the role of real sources of law, acquiring an importance equal or superior to
that of the doctores’ and treatise writers’ theories and opinions. Consequently, it
has been held that, in contrast to the past, when academic lawyers enjoyed most
credit and authority, the new leaders in the legal field were now practical lawyers,
that is, the judges and the advocates of the superior courts. At the same time, the jur-
isprudence of the great tribunals and the collections of their decisiones prevailed over
the consiliatores and their collections of consilia.55 In conclusion, the supreme royal
courts have been credited, thanks to their authoritative interpretation of law, with the
function of assuring in fact – within a jurisprudential legal system such as the ius
“legislative”’, and ‘I Tribunali Supremi’. This point of view has been recently criticized by Birocchi, Alla
ricerca dell’ordine, 85ff., who, assigning to the jurisprudence of the great tribunals only the function to
unify the law within the various states, has denied the supreme courts’ institutional role to do it, holding
that the quotations of foreign decisions contained in the law collections are nothing but the result of a
common legal culture shared by lawyers all over Europe. The authority of the collections of decisiones
both inside and outside their home states has been considered a sign of the presence of a tendency
towards a jurisprudential unity within the European states during the early-modern period by Ascheri,
Tribunali, giuristi, 96.
52According to Professor Ascheri, there were at least 400 printed collections of decisiones in Italy alone
during the early-modern period (Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi, 89). Cf., just to mention some of the main
law collections spread across the continent, the works by de Afflictis, Capece, Grammatico and Minadoi
for the Sacro Regio Consiglio of Naples, Cacherano and Tesauro for the senato of Turin, Fastolf and
Belleme`re for the Roman Rota, Belloni for the rota of Genoa, Le Coq, Papon and Louet for the Paris
Parlement and Pape for the parlement of Grenoble.
53The transnational character of the jurisprudence of the great tribunals is also shown by the long list of
(international) authorities mentioned by Benedict Carpzow, Jurisprudentia Forensis Romano-Saxonica,
Frankfurt, 1650, vol.1, fo.3v, cit. by Ibbetson, Common Law and Jus Commune, 18–19, while Professor
Ascheri describes the legal massimari containing the abridged decisions of the superior courts of the Euro-
pean states (e.g. the works by the Neapolitan lawyers Marta and Borrelli), as real ‘summae’ of the European
jurisprudential law (Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi, 135). The ‘contribution’ by the collections of decisiones to
the European character of the ius commune has also been highlighted by Gorla, ‘I Tribunali Supremi’,
515–517.
54Gorla, ‘L’origine e l’autorita`’, 18–20. See also Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi, 90–92.
55The changed relationship between supreme courts and doctores and the growing importance and power of
the judges of the great tribunals at the consiliatores’ expense have been noted by Gorla, ‘I Tribunali
Supremi’, 464ff.; ‘Unificazione “legislativa”’, 6ff.; ‘L’origine e l’autorita`’, 8; Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi,
65, 189–193. According to Professor Ascheri the rise of case-law and the decline of the consiliatores and
their consilia coincided with the crisis of the Italian universities, giving place to a real ‘divorce’ between
law teaching and legal practice (192).
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commune – the consolidation, the continuity, the evolution and, lastly, the certainty of
law itself.56
The most recent Italian legal historians have acknowledged the merits of the pre-
vious pioneering studies. Nevertheless, after further research, they have gone deep
into some of the data coming from the first studies in the area, showing a few of
their limits.57 First of all, it has been pointed out that it is incorrect to use the
‘great tribunals’ category as a unitary category because this would tend to obscure
not only the diversity of the role and functions, but also the history of the evolution
of the various European supreme courts.58 Although there is general agreement as
to the undisputed jurisprudential character of the ius commune, the binding vis
legis of the decisiones of the great tribunals in practice has been questioned.59 In par-
ticular, the distance between the theoretical authority of judicial precedents affirmed
by the doctores and the real judicial practice of the superior courts on the continent
during the early-modern period has been noted.60 Finally, the prevailing doctrinal
character of the ius commune has been highlighted by the most recent studies. In
fact, if they have confirmed the changed relationship between doctores and practising
lawyers after the rise of the great tribunals, on the other hand they have stressed that
doctrinal authorities (i.e. the opinions of the most credited doctores) continued to be a
fundamental reference point for continental judges and advocates.61
It is true that the authority of the European supreme courts’ jurisprudence was
clearly based on the reasoned opiniones of doctors of law contained in the decisions
of such authoritative courts. At the same time, the existence of a firm and official rule
of stare decisis was normally denied and repudiated by their judges. Nevertheless,
56Gorla, ‘I Tribunali Supremi’, 483ff., called the supreme courts ‘i principali fattori del diritto’ (‘the chief
makers of law’) from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (532).
57The limits of the first studies in the subject, especially of Professor Gorla’s researches, have been pointed
out by Miletti, Stylus judicandi, 3ff., 184ff.; Vallone, Le ‘Decisiones’, 60; Savelli, ‘Tribunali, “decisions” e
giuristi’, 398; and, more recently, by Birocchi, Alla ricerca dell’ordine, 85–93. According to Mario
Ascheri, ‘I Grandi Tribunali e la ricerca di Gino Gorla’, in Sbriccoli and Bettoni, eds., Grandi Tribunali
e Rote, xxi–xxxiii, Professor Gorla’s point of view may be regarded as somehow ‘ideological’ as the
eminent scholar would have devoted his attention to early-modern jurisprudence being critical towards
legal formalism and the idea of law understood only as the – perfect, rational, coherent and complete –
‘product’ by the lawgiver.
58Savelli, ‘Tribunali, “decisiones” e giuristi’, 401ff. For a criticism of the ‘great tribunals’ category see also
Birocchi, Alla ricerca dell’ordine, 85.
59Cf. Vallone, Le ‘Decisiones’, 58ff., who attributed only a ‘persuasive’ authority to the Neapolitan deci-
siones because of their unofficial status. According to Romano, ‘Tribunali, Giudici e Sentenze’, 259–285,
and ‘La Regia Gran Corte’, 145–154, the judicial precedents of the Royal Great Court of Sicily also
enjoyed a limited authority.
60Miletti, Tra equita` e dottrina, 53–81, has highlighted the ideologic character of the Neapolitan lawyers’
insistence on the authority of the judicial precedents of the Sacro Regio Consiglio – to which corresponded,
in practice, the frequently contradictory content of the decisiones, the private and unofficial status of the
collections and the usual recourse to the practice of the re´virement. Miletti reaffirmed the presence of a
gap between lawyers’ theories and real legal practice in Stylus judicandi, 100–192, where he described
the former as abstract, self-praising and continuously contradicted by judicial practice. Massetto,
‘Sentenza’, 1203ff., and Savelli, ‘Tribunali, “decisions” e giuristi’, 411, similarly noted the contradictory
character of the lawyers’ theories in the matter of vis legis of the decisions of the supreme courts.
61See Miletti, Tra equita` e dottrina, 125ff., and Stylus judicandi, 236–242; Savelli, ‘Tribunali, “decisiones”
e giuristi’, 406ff.; Romano, ‘La Regia Gran Corte’, 158. They share the point of view expressed by Ascheri,
Tribunali, giuristi, 93, who described jurisprudence as a ‘particularly qualified element’ of doctrinal law.
276 LEGAL HISTORY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
olo
res
 Fr
ed
a] 
at 
00
:44
 05
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
legal historians have generally alleged the binding force of the continental supreme
courts’ decisions, spread across Europe by the prestigious and widely circulating col-
lections of decisiones.
In particular, they have emphasized the fundamental role played, in the ius
commune system, by the wide interpretation powers of such superior tribunals,
especially taking into consideration the absence of a general duty to express the
reasons (the ratio decidendi or legal grounds) of their judgments. For instance,
courts such as the Sacro Regio Consiglio of Naples, the senati of northern Italy
and the powerful and very authoritative French parlements were not required to
give reasons for their judgments. The duty was imposed upon the Neapolitan court
only in 1774, but in fact it was only in force for fifteen years; the senato of Turin
was ordered to express the reasons for its judgments not before 1723; while the parle-
ments, being ‘sovereign’ courts, asserted that they were not bound to give account for
their judgments, formally because they boasted of administering justice in nomine
principis, who kept the law in scrinio pectoris – hence the sacredness of their judg-
ments – but, as a matter of fact, to preserve their power and autonomy in order to be
able to escape, in this way, from the monarch’s control.62
The great tribunals, thanks to the large discretionary and equitable powers del-
egated to them by the European monarchs, were able to administer justice without
a strict observance of the statute law. Nevertheless, legal historians have suggested
that their discretionary power of interpretation – the ‘arbitrium’ against which the
Illuminists fought, assigning to the word the negative meaning of ‘abuse’ and consid-
ering it as the expression of the ‘despotism’ of the great tribunals and their judges in
the early-modern period63 – was the key to making the ius commune system work.
Such a legal system, in fact – being complicated by a plurality of sources, norms
and procedures – required to be simplified and clarified by the supreme royal
courts’ interpretatio.64
62According to Michele Taruffo, ‘L’obbligo di motivazione della sentenza civile tra diritto comune e Illu-
minismo’, in La formazione storica del diritto moderno in Europa, vol.2, 598–633, the duty of some of the
great tribunals to express the reasons of their judgments was an instrument of control by the monarchs of
European states. Ascheri, Tribunali, giuristi, 55–83, 99–120, with particular reference to the rota of Flor-
ence and the other rote of Northern and Central Italy, highlighted the political meaning of such a duty, stres-
sing its role in widening the public support for the state’s institutions in a period of serious political crisis
and, at the same time, in giving place to a ‘re-appropriation’ of the ius commune by the monarch; while
Piano Mortari, Gli inizi del diritto moderno, 427–430, regarded it as a further sign of the enforcement
of political power in the hands of the European absolute monarchs. See further, on this theme, Massetto,
‘Sentenza’, 1224–45. The problem of giving reasons for their judgments (or not) by the great tribunals
has been particularly investigated by French legal historians: see, among the most recent works, Arlette
Lebigre, ‘“Pour les cas re´sultant du proce`s”. Le Proble`me de la motivation des arreˆts’, 7 Revue d’Histoire
de la Justice (1994), 23–37; Jean Hilaire, ‘Ratio decidendi au Parlement de Paris d’apre`s les registres
d’Olim (1254–1318)’, in Bryson and Dauchy, eds., Ratio decidendi, 25–54; Ve´ronique Demars-Sion
and Serge Dauchy, ‘Argumentation et motivation dans les recueils d’arreˆts des cours souveraines de
France. L’exemple du Parlement de Flandre (fin XVIIe–de´but XVIIIe sie`cle)’, in Albrecht Cordes, ed.,
Juristische Argumentation – Argumente der Juristen, Wetzlar, 2006.
63Illuminists set codification against doctrinal and jurisprudential opinions and the lawgiver – intended as
the sole maker of law and legal certainty – against the judges, to be regarded only as the ‘bouche de la loi’.
64On the great tribunals’ arbitrium the works by Raffaele Ajello are fundamental. See in particular, among
his many contributions, Arcana Juris: diritto e politica nel Settecento italiano, Naples, 1976, 315ff. See, for
‘LAW REPORTING’ IN EUROPE 277
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
olo
res
 Fr
ed
a] 
at 
00
:44
 05
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
In conclusion, such assertions introduce a ‘judicial’ element (in a broad sense)
into the ius commune system. In fact, if we avoid looking for the presence of a
strict observance of the rule of the binding force of precedent on the continent – a
rule that, by the way, was not strictly followed in the common law jurisdiction
either until at least the mid eighteenth century65 – and, at the same time, for the pres-
ence of a strict hierarchy of sources of law, the fundamental role of the great tribunals’
jurisprudence and the collections of their decisions in the elaboration and develop-
ment of continental European law during the medieval and early-modern periods is
absolutely plain. It is clear that the ius commune cannot be considered only as the
result of the interpretatio doctorum – the doctrine of the learned laws developed in
the universities, the consilia and the communis opinio – but must be also seen as a
complex normative entity in which the superior courts’ jurisprudence, widely circu-
lating beyond the borders of the various European states, played a role which cannot
be disregarded.66
a general survey of the doctrines on the judicial arbitrium in the early-modern period, Massimo Meccarelli,
Arbitrium: un’aspetto sistematico degli ordinamenti giuridici in eta` di diritto comune, Milan, 1998.
65See W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, 1923, vol.12, 102ff.; W.S. Holdsworth,
Some Lessons from our Legal History, New York, 1928, 14ff.; W.S. Holdsworth, ‘Case Law’, 50 Law Quar-
terly Review (1934), 180; W.S. Holdsworth, ‘Precedents in the Eighteenth Century’, 51 Law Quarterly
Review (1935), 440. The theorizing of the rule of stare decisis has been dated back to the nineteenth
century by Carleton Kemp Allen, ‘Case Law: an Unwarrantable Intervention’, 51 Law Quarterly Review
(1935), 333; Law in the Making, Oxford, 1927, 219; Dawson, The Oracles, 80ff.; Arthur L. Goodhart, ‘Pre-
cedent in English and Continental Law’, 47 Law Quarterly Review (1934), 40; ‘Case Law: a Short Replica-
tion’, 50 Law Quarterly Review (1934), 196; Harold Potter, A Short Outline of English Legal History, 4th
ed., London 1945, 28–29.
66Ascheri, ‘I Grandi Tribunali’, xvii.
278 LEGAL HISTORY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
olo
res
 Fr
ed
a] 
at 
00
:44
 05
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
